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# Access to media: election 2012

*ANALYTICAL REPORT*

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**Access to media: election 2012: analytical report** / Editing  
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*Academy of Ukrainian Press, international charitable foundation, has been conducting permanent content analysis monitoring survey in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology, NASU, since 2002 studying television programs, radio, national and local print media publications as well Internet media.*

AUP surveys become more intense during the pre-election campaigns when mass media activities start to divert from the standards in young democracies. We should note that the AUP was conducting similar projects during the Presidential elections (2004 and 2010) and Parliamentary elections (2002, 2006, 2007). However, 2012 monitoring project was special for its large scale and systemic approach. It provided an opportunity to monitor the dynamics of political news and political advertising, which is an important constituent of communication between political parties and the public.

So, the project implemented by the AUP during the pre-election campaign in 2012 was supposed to achieve the following goals:

- To provide the public with information on the degree of partiality of top Ukrainian TV channels as well as on the conditions of access to the audience for leading political parties, institutions and persons
- To identify the facts of violating news journalism standards, and, by that,
- To increase the level of media literacy and political culture of citizens during the pre-election campaign 2012.

Within the project's implementation period AUP conducted *monitoring surveys of TV news broadcast by **eight leading Ukrainian TV channels***, i. e. the channels having the highest positions in rankings and traditionally biggest impact over the audience (Inter, 1+1, Novy Channel, STB, ICTV, TRC Ukraine), Pershy Natsionalny as a leading state-owned channel and TVi, which is currently positioned as a leading opposition channel. In October 2012 this sample was added with the **5<sup>th</sup> Channel**. **During 2004 elections** the 5<sup>th</sup> Channel was regarded as an example of balanced editorial policy, being an information-focused channel. The sampling was made in compliance with the principle that it is through these channels that the majority of Ukrainian population get the information on events in Ukraine – watching the news.

*TV news*

**Survey time:** 19:00 – 23:00 (prime –time)

**Monitoring survey waves:** August 6-11, September 3-8 and 10-15, October 1-6, 8-13, 15-20 and 22-27 2012.

*Political advertising*

Political advertising means special designed products, which usually signifies division of the coverage of political life before and during the pre-election cam-

paign, when the elections' participants are the most active in communicating with the voters. The sampling for this survey section was similar: Inter, 1+1, STB, ICTV, Ukraine, Pershy Natsionalny and TVi.

**Survey time:** 19:00 – 23:00 (prime –time)

**Monitoring survey waves:** August 20-25, September 17-22, October 15-20 2012.

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## **Political situation on the eve of the elections**

In 2012 the set of social and political factors made the pre-election competition between key political actors for support and sympathy of Ukrainian voters more acute. They include the questionable development and unobvious results of the institutional reforms initiated by the President of Ukraine; situation in the economy under conditions of European and world economic crises; lack of positive dynamics in the living conditions and quality of life; deepening conflict between the government and the opposition; freezing European integration perspectives of Ukraine.

### ***Reforms and economy***

In 2010 President Yanukovich initiated and supervised the development of the package of key reforms for Ukraine; the government and respective bodies started to implement these reforms. The reforms' goal included deep modernization of the institutional structure, judiciary, deregulation of entrepreneurial activities, raising the status of local government, enhancing and guaranteeing the rights of citizens. The anticipated results were supposed to include: noticeable corruption reduction; reduction of the "gray" economy sector; technological modernization of the industry; support for entrepreneurs and appearance of middle class, democratization of governance, development and strengthening the civil society. However, by Fall 2012 – the year of the Parliamentary election in Ukraine – neither experts' communities, nor voters have been informed adequately on the development and results of the reforms. The government bodies responsible for these reforms were not analyzing the success and failures, were not adjusting the reforms implementation plans, were not improving them, were not establishing communication between those who reform and those to be affected by the reforms.

The world economic crisis has produced almost no effect over Ukraine. The key reason is in weak links of Ukraine's economy with those of Europe and Russia. It still remains to be isolated in many aspects. But the reformers did not make use of this occasional and lucky circumstance – their efforts did not benefit modernization of either state or private business activities; they have not managed to reduce "grey" economy; the social standards have not been enhanced according to the scale how it had been planned – in terms of minimum salary, minimum pension, support for low income population groups.

### *Access to media: election 2012*

In the course of pre-election campaign the governing authorities presented their achievements by speaking about the stabilization in the economy and the society, avoiding the discussion about the reforms' development.

### ***Conflict of the governing authorities and the opposition***

After the Presidential elections in 2010 when V. Yanukovich, the Party of Regions' leader was elected the President, this Party constructed the majority in the Parliament and had the Prime Minister appointed. Many experts and EU officials put this process under doubt in terms of its compliance with the Constitution. At the same time a set of legislative acts were amended, making the opposition weaker as an institution in the Parliament.

Due to the lack of rules how the majority and the minority should interact in the Parliament or due to the ignorance of existing rules, the cases of direct physical contact between these factions became more frequent: blocking the Parliament's speaking platform, interference with the computer systems of the Parliament, brawls.

The new majority blamed the new minority (former majority) in the unbalancing of the state administration system, unprofessional interventions in the economy, shackling agreement with Russia on gas supply, the abuse of office of former officials at the Ministries. During the whole pre-election campaign Yu. Tymoshenko, former Prime Minister and Yu. Lutsenko, former Minister of the Interior were under investigation and were convicted for several years in prison before the elections. Also some investigations were undertaken regarding some Ministers of the former government and their deputies, some of them were kept at pre-trial detention centers; D. Danylyshyn, former Minister of Economy and Aleksander Tymoshenko, Yu. Tymoshenko's husband left the country and were granted political asylum in Czech Republic, A. Avakov, former Head of Kharkiv Oblast State Administration also stays abroad.

Social polarization in the society strengthened; many trials and courts' verdicts are considered by many experts in Europe and North America as "political"; European integration perspectives of Ukraine have been disputed even more.

### ***Electoral preferences of voters***

The elections-related legislation in Ukraine was amended a year before the elections. The return was made to the mixed system when half of the Parliament members are elected in the multi-constituency district according to parties lists, the second half is elected in single constituency districts. The second adopted novelty consisted in prohibition to create blocks of parties. This new feature made

many parties to disband and to join Ukrainian “political giants” – Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna – or to give up participation in the elections if their leader personally joins the mentioned big parties. “Sylna Ukraine” headed by S. Tyhypko, vice prime minister, joined the Party of Regions. A. Yatsenyuk, “Front of Changes” party leader, former speaker of the Parliament, became the first in Batkivshchyna party list, and his party proposed its candidates in single constituency districts.

Both mentioned politics were supported during the first round of the Presidential elections by 7% (A. Yatsenyuk) and 13% (S. Tyhypko) of voters. Therefore, the most crucial question of the Parliamentary election campaign was about the choice of these voters, mostly young ones, who perceived “Sylna Ukraine” and “Front of changes” as alternatives of “political giants”, these giants already built and have been keep intact their stable support of 25-33% of voters within the decade.

The pre-election polls showed that the newly created parties: UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms) by V. Klychko, heavyweight boxing champion and “Ukraine-Forward!” by N. Korolevska, MP, formerly elected according to BYUT block list, have equal chances to get these votes. Also the chances to win seats in the Parliament were realistic for the following parties: the Communist Party of Ukraine, which is represented in the Parliament of Ukraine without interruptions; Our Ukraine, the party of V. Yushchenko, the President of Ukraine in 2004-2009, which was supported by voters three times; and Svoboda with radical nationalism tint, which reached success a year ago at local government bodies elections in the Western Ukraine and now recruiting more supporters in central Ukraine.

One could hardly expect that controversial – conflict, complicated and ambiguous – social and economic and political situations will be fully reproduced in the news programs of the top television channels. The very format of the news is not susceptible to provide such hopes. However, there were opportunities in place, but the newsrooms did not make use of them properly.



## **The status and dynamics of political news in the pre-election parliamentary campaign in 2012**

**Preface.** Access to media is an indispensable condition for conducting democratic elections. In imperfect democracies the condition is not regularly met; it is quite problematic, which is especially evident in pre-election campaigns, when media become the symbolic battleground to win the voters' support. TV news and political advertising broadcast by TV constitute the highly popular platforms for such contests, because television (at least in Ukraine and in other former communist countries) remains the key source of information and knowledge about the world. This order legitimizes the social ontology: "to be means to be shown by TV" (Bourdieu).

While analyzing the pre-election campaign on TV, one should bear in mind that media is not only about the politics; its functioning and development are regulated by global trends. Putting it in very general terms, one can say that there are two controversial trends in Ukrainian mass media just like in most national media. First, communication becomes more and more *all-purpose* due to wider access to media and the clone-like content (only 6% of those who do not have a TV set do not watch TV, and the global mass culture inculcate its standards). At the same time, media market impact *disengages* cultural, social, political differences in communications. Political TV broadcasting is not an exception here.

In Ukraine two thirds of adult population regularly watches news. Its political impact could be significant, but there is a considerable resistant attitude of Ukrainian audience as well as low level of trust to political media (around 30%). The political media are perceived as tools of influence of the elites and the ruling power. According to "Ukrainian society" monitoring conducted by the Institute of Sociology of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, within the recent decade the level of trust to media was lower than that to church and army, but higher than that to the President, the Government and, without saying, political parties.

Most current media theories agree about the fact that news should be conceptualized as a sort of compromise among the impact of various controlling agencies – the power, the market, cultural and professional standards, i. e. news will always be interpretations of events, being presented in the news as events *per se*. These interpretations tend to be loyal to the most influential political actors. These hypotheses are confirmed by the findings of the TV Political News Content Analysis Monitoring conducted by the Academy of Ukrainian Press since 2002. Upon observing the pre-election parliamentary campaign 2012 at Ukrainian TV one may draw two most important conclusions: **1) without doubt, the channels**

**have their own political preferences; 2) representation of these preferences is the subject to adjustments if there is a goodwill of the channels to adjust them.** These conclusions are confirmed by empirical data.

**Survey methodology.** News monitoring is conducted in compliance with the classical version of content analysis (G. Laswell, B. Berelson, D. Gerbner, et al.) as well as sociological approach (random research, rigorous method, controllable data).

The survey purpose is to define the status and dynamics of the political content of Ukrainian television channels' news under conditions of the pre-election campaign

*The conceptual framework* of the content analysis of audio and visual information includes the following key categories: *report* (report features, topic, viewpoints upon the event, context), *information flow* (the aggregate of reports), *political subjects* (institutions, parties, persons), *political field in the news* (differentiation of the channels as regards various indicators). The survey *operational framework: context unit* is a news program, *analysis unit* is a report. Measurement units: 1) appearance of a category (feature of a category) in the report; 2) the time allocated for broadcasting the category, the content unit.

**The key indicators**, documented within the monitoring survey:

- Degree of balance in an event's interpretation
- The rank in rating as regards the attention to political entities/assessments of political entities
- Access of politicians to news (direct speech allocated to them)
- Types of news broadcasting

Sampling: nine leading Ukrainian channels: *Pershy Natsionalny*, *1+1*, *Inter*, *Novy Channel*, *ICTV*, *STB*, *Ukraine*, *TVi*, *5th channel*. The survey timeframe: the 1st week of August, 2 weeks in September, 4 weeks in October. Programs' sampling: key evening news, broadcast in prime time. 364 news programs (3974 news reports on Ukraine) were under analysis.

Content analysis survey was implemented by the team of trained coders with mandatory test before each monitoring wave and control after each wave. The methodology reliability coefficient is 85-95% (for different categories of the analysis). The digital audio and visual recordings are provided by the Academy of Ukrainian Press.

## **The specific features and trends in broadcasting the news during the pre-election parliamentary campaign (August – October 2012).**

**1) During the pre-election campaign the political news representation was gradually more and more mobilized.** The share of the reports on political news in Ukraine in Ukraine was growing (from 27% in August to 39% in the late October), as well as the share of the reports on the topic of elections (from 10% in August to 35% in the late October).


**The channels are substantially different** in this regard and follow their own broadcasting strategies. There are at least three broadcasting strategies at Ukrainian television currently:

- «*News as emergencies and disasters*» with the share of political news not exceeding 20% (1+1),
- «*News-omnibus*», with one third of all reports about politics in the country (Novy Channel, STB, ICTV, Ukraine),
- «*Political informing*», focusing the attention on political events in Ukraine, allocating more than 50% of all reports for political news (Pershy Natsionalny, Inter as well TVi and the 5th channel).

Although the attention to political events is undoubtedly growing closer to elections, and, consequently, political activity of the population, the indicator recorded within the frame of the monitoring survey never reaches the level of the President elections in 2004. At those elections political events' share was more than 50% of all news reports and the expected event – “the elections” was covered as something extraordinary. Within the pre-election campaign 2012 symptoms of de-politicization of the news remain (the trend has appeared since December 2010 (Diagram 1). According to the data on the audience's preferences, the degree of interest to politics has started to decrease right after the parliamentary elections 2010.

Diagram 1.

**Dynamics of the volume of political news of the top Ukrainian channels: 2004-2012 (% of political news in Ukraine in news programs)**



During the election campaign the attention to the **topic of elections** (as a key one or an additional one in news' reports) was reaching the share of a half of all reports at *Pershy Natsionalny* and *Inter* (51%) and 14% at *1+1* in late October. The events related to elections move in the rating of attention from lower ranks to the tops and are distributed throughout the whole directory of events. Nevertheless, the channels are still quite picky in terms of coverage of pre-election campaign, demonstrating their own political preferences, as it is witnessed in the map of the channels' attention to events.


At *1+1* the attention to car accidents and crime prevails that to the elections. *Pershy Natsionalny* takes the lead in broadcasting the information from official sources (declarations of parties, press releases from the parties press services). *TVi*, 5<sup>th</sup> channel, *Inter* actively cover the violations during the pre-election campaign as well as abuse of government's resources (so-called administrative resource). *Novy Channel*, *STB*, *Ukraine* provide detailed information on the pre-election tours of the political leaders, broadcasting especially many reports on the ceremonies of solemn opening of various industrial enterprises by the President and the Prime Minister. The situation with electoral constituencies' districts, which make up half of future members of the Parliament has not been analyzed and almost not forecast.

**2) The level of balance in the news, i.e. representation of events with several viewpoints remains low during the whole campaign (up to 20%).** Most of political news reports are broadcast with only one viewpoint. One may say that the elections are not the event that made the channels to comply with this indicator better. Nevertheless, some channels made a noticeable step forward in this aspect. The positive dynamics is observed at *Inter* (from 17% to 32%), partially at *ICTV* (from 5% to 13%). In general, during the parliamentary pre-election cam-

paign the most balanced news were broadcast by Inter, 1+1, TVi, partially by the 5th channel; the least balanced news were broadcast by Pershy Natsionalny, this latter one had only 2-3% of all reports, including more than one viewpoint upon the events (Diagram 2).

Diagram 2

**The level of balance in the news broadcast by top Ukrainian channels: September-October 2012. (% of the reports including one and several viewpoints)**



The events most often covered in the news from different political perspectives are those, which can be interpreted in different manners due to their publicity as well as shocking and scandalous events. They include the events related to: imprisonment of the leaders of the opposition (Yuliya Tymoshenko, Yuriy Lutsenko); the adoption of the “language” law by the Parliament of Ukraine and the related protests aroused by this Law. During the last week before the elections the news with different viewpoints included: the lawsuit filed by Natalia Korolevskaya against sociologists, the tragedy in Karavan mall; the case of Dnipropetrovsk terrorists; violations at polling stations; cases when voters were bribed; controversial consequences of installation of surveillance web cameras. However, the news reports did not include most important national issues deserving proper discussion: successes and barriers in the process of implementation of the Modernization Strategy initiated by the President of Ukraine in 2010; struggle against corruption, enhancement of the living standards and the quality of life of Ukrainian citizens; and perspectives for Ukraine’s European integration.

**3) Political mobilization of the news consequently made visible more political actors.** Whereas in summer 2011 and summer 2012 political parties, civic associations were featured in the news mostly unintentionally and occasionally, in October on the eve of Parliamentary elections they were present in one fourth of all news about Ukraine (25% of the reports on Ukraine). However, this figure is

significantly lower than that of the Presidential elections in 2004 (up to 40%) and Parliamentary elections in 2007 (33%).

The leaders of attention in the news among the *political parties* are also leaders of electoral sympathies, staying high in rankings of the sociological polls. During the last two weeks before the elections they were as follows: Party of Regions (9.4%, 5.4%), Batkivshchyna (9.4%, 7.0%), UDAR (7.4%, 3.7%), Svoboda (5.4%, 1.3%), CPU (2.4%, 2.5%), Ukraine-Forward! (1.7%, 2.5%). All other parties registered to compete in the parliamentary election race were mentioned in less than 1% of all news reports. The leaders of attention get most of the criticism: the objects of criticism are, before all, Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, ruling coalition, opposition in general.

The attention to the *political institutions* varies around 62-64% of all news reports, which is similar for the period of time before the pre-election campaign. The leaders of attention are stable throughout the whole period of monitoring: the ministries of interior and SSU have the highest ranks (23-27%) followed by the justice structures (13-17%), whereas the attention to the President, Government and the Parliament is noticeably less (up to 10-11%). These figures produce mixed images of a police and legalistic state when law enforcement structures are in fact involved in the political process. The experts consider this situation as an obvious abnormality. These very institutions get the biggest number of negative assessments as well as the local government bodies – frequent object of criticism in the news programs.

Only Ukraine as a sovereign state has the positive image in the news.

The personal appearances in information causes also increased compared to summer months (from 32% to 46%) but also does not reach the level of attention to *political persons* at the previous elections (66%). So-called “ruling power bonus”, i. e. privileged attention to key government figures in the news has substantially reduced since late 2010 – early 2011, varying around 10%. In case of the Parliament’s speaker, it has disappeared whatsoever. One may say that news do not provide any bonuses for the Parliament, which is close to the end of its operations; the current Parliament presents no interest for journalists. Three persons – leaders of attention in the news are not present in the Parliament (President Yanukovich, Prime-Minister Azarov, Yu. Tymoshenko). However, they are identified with the key political adversarial political forces. The leaders of the competing political forces are also allocated with the biggest volume of direct speech, although judging from the time allocated for direct speech, the chances for various political actors to clearly pronounce their viewpoints vary quite significantly from channel to channel.

#### **4) Political preferences of the channels are quite noticeable.**


In general, the **distribution of attention** to political forces in the news information flow obviously favors the representatives of the current ruling power and the members of the Party of Regions having the majority in the Parliament. During the last week of October the share of attention to the Party of regions was 28%, Batkivshchyna – 18%, UDAR – 4%, Ukraine-Forward! – 4%, CPU – 3%, Svoboda – 2%. The attention to the Party of regions was quite similar across the channels: only the *5th channel* had a substantially lower share (14%). The attention to the opposition, Batkivshchyna is much more variable, it exceeds the average at the *5th channel*, *TVi*, *Ukraine*, *STB*, *Inter* (20-28%) and is below the average at *Pershy Natsionalny*, *1+1*, *ICTV* and *Novy Channel* (8-14%).

**Distribution of direct speech**, the real access of political parties to TV differentiates the channels even more visibly. Such differentiation is quite comprehensible, because direct speech of a politician in live air is paid by the most precious resource of a channel – the time – therefore, they cannot allocate it in vain or randomly. During the last week of October the share of direct speech of the Party of Regions' representatives was 29%, Batkivshchyna – 12%, UDAR – 5%, Ukraine-Forward! – 3%, CPU – 4%, Svoboda – 1%. Thus, on the eve of the elections the ruling party representatives were speaking in the news by 2.5 times more than their key competitors from Batkivshchyna. At such channels as *Pershy Natsionalny*, *ICTV*, *STB* this difference was even bigger: 3.8 – 4 times more, *1+1* – 11.6 times, at *Inter* – 1.6 times. However, *TVi* and the *5th channel* featured bigger share of Batkivshchyna party compared to the Party of Regions (1.5 and 2.5 times, respectively).

Judging from the monitoring data, during the whole October, the asymmetry in distribution of the direct speech of politicians in the news may be illustrated as "*Party of Regions and all the rest*". If we include the direct speech allocated for the President (14%), representatives of government who do not explicitly associate themselves with their party (7%), members of the Party of regions, then the share of direct speech allocated for the Party Regions exceeds half of all the time allocated for politicians (56%). At the same time, the aggregate direct speech for all opposition parties is 19% (Batkivshchyna -11%, UDAR – 6%, Svoboda – 2%). The shares of all other parties, independent candidates in electoral constituencies are negligible. ( Diagram 3).

Diagram 3

***Distribution of direct speech of the political forces participating in parliamentary elections: October 2012 (% , N = 21252 sec)***




This situation is not unique. The parliamentary election in 2007 provided similar picture of the privileged position of the ruling parties. In September 2007 the attention to NUNS was evidently on the top at all channels, and it was universal across all channels (35-40%). However, direct speech was allocated in a much more selective way. However, there was an equality: on the one hand, the Party of Regions (36%), on the other hand – NUNS and BYUT (22%, 13%). On the eve of the elections 2012 the proportions of the direct speech allocated to politicians are more distorted.

In general, the allocation of the direct speech for politicians in the news commensurate with the preference of the voters, who voted for their parties, but with the significant disproportion in favor for the ruling party. The channels regulated this correlation in different manners. The monitoring findings document the inclinations of the channels belonging to *different media holdings* to allocate direct speech unevenly among various political parties (Diagram 4).



Diagram 4

**The map of the news direct speech allocated for various political parties: October 2012 (correspondence analysis, N= 21252 sec)\***



\* Chi-square observed value (df = 120): 5818,228, Chi-square critical value (df = 120): 146,571, the dependence between the rows («political parties») and the columns (tv-channels) is significant at the level of significance  $\alpha = 0,050$

The map of the news direct speech for October 2012 is center-wise by the big volumes of direct speech allocated for the Party of Regions at most channels. However, there are some specific features of the channels:

- Whereas *TVi* and *Channel 5* distribute their air time in favor of so-called “traditional opposition” – *Batkivshchyna* and *Svoboda*, providing no chance to have their say for the communists, and *Inter* provides the biggest opportunity for *UDAR*, the new opposition of the middle class, then
- *Pershy Natsionalny*, in addition to serving the ruling party, evidently takes care of so-called “party projects”, which participate in the election race as useful tools (*Ukraine-Forward!*, *O. Lyashko Radical Party*, *New Politics*, *Green Planet*), as well as some independent candidates in electoral constituencies.

- The preferences of *TRC Ukraine* also belong to the Party of regions and the President, Ukraine-Forward! party, whose direct speech exceeds that of *Batkivshchyna*.
- *STB, ICTV* – Preferring the direct speech of the President and the Party of Regions members in the news, they distribute equally the airtime among *batkivshchyna nad UDAR*, also not forgetting *Svoboda* leaders; *Novy Channel* is quite close to them, belonging to the same media holding.
- *1+1* channel provides the smallest share of direct speech for *Batkivshchyna*.

However, the dynamics of the news during the whole pre-election campaign gives grounds for optimism. The attention to political parties was moving to more balanced coverage, i. e. the attention to the Party of Regions reduced (from 44% in September to 28% in the end of October). The same can be applied to the direct speech of the ruling party members: its share reduced from 49% to 29%. The most illustrative examples could be observed at *Inter* channel, *TVi*, to some extent – *ICTV*. As for *Inter* channel, which suggested taking part in the monitoring and committed itself to provide impartial coverage of the pre-election campaign, the adjustments in the news were obviously a conscious and well-thought decision in favor of more civilized TV and its standards. Without doubt, this position of the channels expands the limits of politically possible steps and improves informing the audience.

**Conclusions.** The monitoring survey of the news programs broadcast by the top Ukrainian channels let us draw the following statements and conclusions on the status and dynamics of the pre-election campaign's development at the television.

- During the pre-election campaign the news becomes more and more politically mobilized. The share of political news was gradually increasing as the date of the election got closer, however, the recent trend of depoliticization of the news was not overcome.
- The balance in the news, i. e. representation of events with several viewpoints remains low during the whole campaign (up to 20%). The prevailing share of the political news (80%) is broadcast with only one viewpoint.
- The attention to elections significantly increased in the news by October 2012. However, the situation in electoral constituencies where half of future members of the parliament are elected was poorly covered and discussed. The news did not feature the most important national issues: successes and barriers in the process of implementation of the Modernization Strategy initiated by the President of Ukraine in 2010; struggle against corruption,

enhancement of the living standards and the quality of life of Ukrainian citizens; and perspectives for Ukraine's European integration.

- In the course of the pre-election campaign the attention to the political actors who participate in it increases. Within all months of the monitoring the social institutions, which are most frequently mentioned in the news are Ministries of the Interior and the Security Service of Ukraine. In fact, they constitute participants of the political process, which is considered by the experts as an evident abnormality.
- The attention to political parties on the eve of the elections is noticeably higher than in summer months or in September, but lower than during the previous parliamentary and presidential election campaigns. Most channels provide the majority of the attention to the ruling government representatives and the Party of regions' members, which has the majority in the Parliament.
- The distribution of direct speech is asymmetric: during the whole campaign the representatives of ruling government speak 2-3 times more than the opposition representatives. On the eve of the elections more than 50% of the direct speech was allocated to the President and the representatives of the Party of Regions.
- The channels obviously demonstrate their political preferences. The monitoring findings document the inclinations of the channels belonging **to different media holdings** to allocate direct speech unevenly among various political parties. Such preferential positions may be adjusted: more balanced presentation of the news may be reached when the owners are giving clear signals and the respective changes in the editorial policy.

## **How did the government and civil society sector improve the political news during the pre-election period or a Quest for standards**

It is a routinely repeated rhetoric now that the society is not happy about the deeds and moral values of journalists. They say journalists are not responsible, their conduct provokes the moral crisis in the society as well as the problems with bringing up children in a proper way. On the one hand, often this criticism is justified. Everyone may recollect when journalists' conduct was incompatible with the standards of ethics. But the various peoples in various periods of time were quite similar in their condemnation of moral standards of journalism, which is an evidence of the partiality of most such claims. True enough, journalists' profession per se often make them assess certain society members (even while complying with the "news from views" principle). The very selection of news and their order may be perceived as an assessment. Obviously, some people will not like it. Individuals tend to be critical to those who dared to assess their steps, identify societal benchmarks and be a guide in discussing the issues highly important for the public. This imposes on the journalists a special responsibility to thoroughly comply with professional rules of treating their audience.

Starting the work on collecting the data for a report, a journalist has to remember that his/her key goal is to satisfy the right of the audience to get the reliable and full information, which of public interest. This information is crucially necessary for the public, because they will not be able to position themselves without this information in the modern complex world as well as to identify their own visions and benchmarks. Therefore, the core job and the key purpose of a journalist are to gather facts, work with the data, and not to express his/her own views on the facts' interpretation.

It is the journalist's duty to ensure fair, accurate and balanced coverage of events and deeds of individuals.

One of the key objectives of a journalist is to identify the truth and to inform about it. While doing that, a journalist must be as honest and impartial as possible.

A journalist must display accurateness in handling the facts, must not distort the facts, must avoid mistakes and check the information. The distortion of the facts is not allowed at any circumstances. The ultimate goal cannot justify the means to reach it.

A journalist has the right to abide with his/her own views but should not impose them on other individuals. He/she has to gather and provide all facts and views, even those, which do not coincide with her /his own point of view. It is of special

importance while presenting the viewpoints of average citizens, who normally do not have the chance to pronounce their say. There should not be a difference between official and unofficial sources of information for a journalist.

While collecting special information, it is important to remember about the journalist's professional responsibility. This is not the responsibility to an owner or a sponsor, it is the responsibility to the public.

One should also delineate a clear bordering line between the statement of facts and journalist's comments. The audience HAS THE RIGHT to draw its own conclusions from the facts. The comment should be clearly divided from the factual statement.

The requirement to ensure balance in journalists' materials is also of importance. If a journalist writes on controversial topics, the audience has the right to know the viewpoints of key involved persons. This is one of a journalist's work standards.

The lack of references to the source of information is one more inadmissible error. Unfortunately, very often the source is not mentioned, and the audience has the impression that the journalist has found all the information him/herself. This imposes an additional responsibility over a journalist and constitutes a violation of the ethics regarding real sources of information. The same standards are applied to the process of commenting. The international standard is to get a comment from an independent expert. Unfortunately, in Ukraine comments are commonly provided by either politicians or journalists themselves.

One more considerable problem is a hidden advertising. "Dzhynsa" (hidden advertising) is inadmissible. The audience HAS THE RIGHT to know when a journalist writes his/her report and when this journalist advertises a product (irrespective of its character: commercial or political).

The attitude of a journalist to the individuals covered in his/her materials must be especially responsible. A journalist must bear in mind that a reputation as well as an honest name can be destroyed with just one word; a journalist must remember that every person covered in the report has a family and friends. Awareness of these facts will help a journalist to identify a correct balance between the interests of a society and the specific individual.

One should be especially careful while covering the problems that may arouse biased attitude to some groups of individuals or a specific person as regards their race, nationality, sex (or sexual preferences), language, religious beliefs, etc. Journalists must be aware of the danger to be diverted by the negative biases existing in consciousness and not to make the persons covered in the materials victims of these biases.

The key standards of journalism, especially in pre-election period, include: 1) accuracy of facts, 2) balanced positions, 3) reliability of news, 4) completeness of information.

### **Accuracy**

A journalist must be sure in the accuracy of the information he/she reports on. For that purpose a journalist must be sure that his/her sources of information are reliable. It is considered sufficient to check the information at two other independent sources. A journalist must be especially careful lest he/she inflict some damage by the incompleteness or inaccuracy of information.

The intended distortion of facts, their biased selection, dissemination of false or semi-false information, accepting the bribe or incentive from third parties in exchange for publishing certain facts or opinions constitute a brutal violation of the standards of ethics.

Quite often inaccuracy is a result of an average journalist's negligence. Unfortunately, currently almost all media outlets do not have the departments on information check. That enhances the danger of unintended errors. Such errors do a severe damage to the reputation and image of the whole media outlet as well as the journalist, author of the copy.

The unchecked and inaccurate information appear also due to the lack of time and the journalist's eagerness to report on the news earlier than other media. However, often such endeavors to enhance one's reputation result in contrary effects. Thus, information distributed by mass media must be mandatorily checked.

### **Balance**

Compliance with this principle requires fulfillment of three conditions:

- 1) all the information collected by the journalists while writing the report should be provided and analyzed;
- 2) a journalist must provide all key viewpoints on the subject-matter of his/her material;
- 3) facts and the journalist's own thoughts should be clearly divided. The audience has the right to know not only the thought of a journalist on a specific event, but it should be provided with an opportunity to independently draw conclusions on the basis of the collected data and facts.

The problem of neutrality of journalists' reports constitutes a separate problem. A journalist must be neutral working in the information genre. While writing an analytical material or as a columnist the journalist may express his/her own position.

But the audience should be able to differentiate this position from other opinions and facts.

### **Reliability**

A journalist shall be held responsible not only for complying ethical standards, but also regarding the reliability of the information posted in his/her material. Besides, one should bear in mind that journalists shall not use illegal or disreputable methods of the data collection. The use of such methods is justified only in cases of an acute public necessity.

### **Completeness**

One more important condition of comprehensive collection and representation of information is the completeness in the facts' coverage. The media shall present all significant facts on the highlighted problem without exceptions and lacunae. The incomplete picture distorts the reality in the eyes of the audience. The arbitrary picking of facts is a severe violation of ethical and professional standards.

The same standard is applied to the judgments and opinions. While covering the problem journalists shall provide the whole range of key statements on the related issue.

Thus, while covering the pre-election war of words, journalists have to abide with the same norms and standards as in the times of "peace". Unfortunately, the recent elections' results demonstrated significant violations of the standards committed by some channels, especially by *Pershy Natsionalny*. However, the position of the state authorities looks surprising. Instead of providing their audience with complete and full-fledged information products broadcast by the state-run TV channel (which is financed with the voter's money, by the way), they chose the approach of creating alternative monitoring agencies.

It goes without saying that any attempts to study the access of voters to the information on political forces are welcome. Obviously, such efforts should be undertaken responsibly and professionally. All the more so, if the research findings are related to the reputation of the government authorities. I don't think there can be excuses expressed on impact of the "human nature factor" or the State TV and Radio Committee's *"lack of quality technical and program support as well as extra funding for these purposes"* (quote by O. V. Kurdynovych, Head of State Committee on Television and Radio). To my mind, one should either undertake an endeavor at a proper quality level, or should not do anything if the quality is not assured. The point is that it is not the judgmental opinions are under discussion, but some solid indicators people tend to trust in, the more so because they are presented by "the authorized government body".

It is a pity that “the authorized government body” has not involved any sociologists in the process of designing methodology and methods of its monitoring research. This step being done, they could have avoided most errors, in particular, systemic ones. I think one of the most problematic issues lies in labeling all parties except the Party of Regions as “opposition” ones. Wikipedia’s cited definition of the opposition (by the way, I would not personally call it “a classical one” as the Head of the State Committee on Television and Radio puts it) does not save the situation.

The mentioned definition also names it as something “differing from the opinion of the majority”, but Party of Regions in itself does not constitute a majority. In general, in most similar researches, the political forces constituting the ruling coalition are defined as “ruling power” (all these forces may energetically compete with each other during the pre-election campaign), those forces staying in the parliament’s opposition marked as “opposition”, and those not represented in the parliament – as third parties. But even if the State Committee does not share such an approach, would it be more accurate to present political forces separately, so that, as Mr. Kurdinovich states, “to provide the audiences with an opportunity to decide by themselves” whether specific political parties belong to the ruling power.

It is surprising that the State Committee refuses to consider the coverage of the activities by the leader and the ruling power’s electoral list’s first position to be this party’s assets. Certainly, the chief authorities must implement their duties at the time of the elections, but what they do – reinforce the preferential position of the ruling party. There is a specific term – “power bonus”, which postulates the standard that ruling power always generates more alluring topics for media coverage than the opposition. Here we discuss only the disparities. In democratic countries they are moderate, ours are shocking. Although, obviously, if we unite all parties except one with the common “opposition” label as it is done in the State TV and Radio Committee’s monitoring, one can hide this drastic misbalance.

Unfortunately, the State TV and Radio Committee Head’s answers have not clarified the monitoring’s methodology. There are a lot of questions there. Here is the example. One can’t combine the data on advertising and on news in one research. One can’t do that even in Ukraine, with our news, which more and more resemble even not hidden, but explicit advertising. But these are fundamentally two different things: news and advertising. They must be done in compliance with frequently opposite principles. Also direct speech by political parties should be measured. Because it is through direct speech that politicians have the opportunity to address “directly” (even bearing the editor’s tuning in mind) their audiences.

But there is one more surprising aspect. One may think that if you put an individual in front of a TV and provide him/her with a stopwatch timer, one may get



reliable data. And by assigning this person to watch TV 24 hours. Further calculations are terrifying: 10 persons (according to the State Committee Head it was the monitoring team) are divided into two groups taking turns with each other. 5 persons of each group watch 8 monitored channels. Afterwards, as it is clear from the answers, the records are checked to identify cases when several participants of the elections appear in one TV story. According to the Head of the State TV and Radio Committee, these staff members of the Committee also implement their own job duties. According to him, they watch TV channels just as volunteers, because of their "enthusiasm". One may cry: "It is a miracle!"; but it is really sad. Maybe, one should not let down "the empowered government body", publishing such amateur surveys under its aegis. My impression is that the State TV and Radio Committee should have asserted more responsible approach to basic preparatory work. If they don't have their own professionals, and they don't want to outsource non-government structures, still there is the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Science of Ukraine. They have a lot of experienced professionals who could have helped to avoid many regrettable mistakes that turn a reliable research into dubious observations.

The similar survey conducted by the National TV Company of Ukraine also leaves sad impressions. It is worth praise when NTCU issues a declaration that the NTCU "while producing news is guided by the principle of providing equal access to all candidates and parties – the electoral race participants". We can praise it if it is supported by the facts. Alas, it is not. I purposefully reduced the citation in order to focus on political news. Why? Because it is the type of journalism which has the task to provide the most complete and impartial picture of the reality. It is especially important during the pre-election contest. The author programs, let alone advertising, are not supposed to do that. Secondly, the prime-time news is the subject matter of the survey in accordance with the Memorandum on cooperation between the monitoring agencies and TV channels, and Pershy Natsionalny signed that memorandum.

The *Pershy Natsionalny* press service issued a press release, including their own findings in contrast to those the AUP got. But let us have a look at the text of the press release. Which data in the AUP survey did the Pershy Natsionalny use to compare with their data? Let us be specific. Here is the news in the last month before the elections. The first week of October – 100 (one hundred)% of the news on events in Ukraine were broadcast with only one viewpoint; the second week – 97%. One can't deny it!

The ratings of attention: the ruling power and the ruling coalition (the President, the Party of Regions' representatives, non-party affiliated government representatives, CPU reps, single constituency elected MPs aligned with the ruling government) – 1st week – 66%, the 2nd week – 69% (PR in both cases – 43%). Two thirds of attention! It is even more impressive with direct speech. The first week: 74%,

the 2nd week – 67% (PR – 47% and 44%, respectively). One can compare these figures with those for Batkivshchyna: 12% and 7% (direct speech: 12% and 9%), UDAR: 5% and 2% (direct speech for the 1st week – 2%, 2nd week – no direct speech whatsoever). Does that mean “ensuring an equal access for all candidates – individuals and political parties – competing to win seats in the Parliament”?

It is noteworthy that the attempts to discredit the findings of the professional monitoring surveys are conducted according to the same procedure as those to discredit sociological polls' results. The institutions, which apparently do not have either experience or understanding what sociology and public opinion surveys as well as mass communication content analysis essentially are, just present convenient findings with no understandable methods how they obtained the data. Why do they do that? Just to relieve themselves? To create a favorable image for the international community? To avoid criticism by the bosses? Maybe, it is better to produce more civilized news in compliance with the best international standards? Is it too difficult a route?

Our NTCU colleagues consider all statements on “political dependence and impartiality of the channel” as manipulative ones. It is their right to say so. They are free people (at least one may hope they are). But they should think about the perception by their target audience. About the ratings of their news. About the responsibility they have as regards those who trust them.

However, there were some positive moments worth mentioning.

*Inter*, *ICTV*, *Novy Channel*, *STB*, *Ukraine* agreed to be subjects of the independent monitoring of the news on the eve of the elections (the 5<sup>th</sup> channel and *UT-1* joined them a bit later). They and the civil society organizations' representatives signed the memorandum: “Open news for fair elections”.

According to the press release issued by the International Renaissance Foundation, by signing the memorandum they consented to the independent monitoring to be conducted by the civil society organizations to study their news to identify whether the equal access to mass media for all elections' participants was ensured and whether the standards of journalism were complied with while covering the pre-election campaign. The TV managers promised to listen to the comments by media experts and take them into consideration. The monitoring's goal was defined as to ensure full-fledged implementation of the law on elections of the people's deputies (members of the Parliament) and compliance with the international standards, particularly, with the Recommendations by the Council of Europe and OSCE on coverage of elections.

The following key conditions and principles for this cooperation were agreed (posted at Telekrytyka web site):

### *Access to media: election 2012*

- All initiative signatories shall identify and agree on the key criteria against which the independent monitoring is conducted; the TV channels shall commit themselves to comply with these criteria while covering the elections in Ukraine.
- Every week the TV news monitoring fresh findings (monitoring projects conducted by *Telekrytyka*, *Academy of Ukrainian Press*, *Common Space Association* in cooperation with *Equality of opportunities Committee*) shall be sent to the secretary of the initiative.
- The secretary shall process the data of the monitoring surveys and send them to the Monitoring Experts' Group (MEG).
- MEG shall discuss the monitoring data (on-line or offline) and identify the key and most illustrative facts of violations of the criteria of the pre-election campaign's coverage and provide the most important comments for consideration of the channels.
- The agreed and processed data and the expert's conclusions within the frame of a specific document shall be sent to representatives of the TV channels – the initiative signatories.
- Representatives of TV channels – the initiative signatories shall familiarize themselves with the monitoring report and identify how they will respond to the monitoring results.
- If needed, particularly if any controversies, objections to the monitoring data or the MEG conclusions arise, the meeting of all initiative participants shall be conducted and the monitoring findings shall be discussed
- While drafting the next independent monitoring report, the MEG will follow up whether the results (comments) on the previous report have been taken into consideration by the channels
- The Advisory Board will discuss the monitoring results and make conclusions on the situation with coverage of the pre-election campaign in Ukraine.
- Once in two weeks the Advisory Board will issue a statement on evaluation of the TV channels' (the initiative participants) compliance with the international standards and provisions of Ukrainian legislation on elections while covering the pre-election campaign.
- After the elections the MEG and the Advisory Board representatives will provide a final assessment of the TV channels' abidance with their commitments.

*The initiative Advisory Board members are as follows: Anders Aslund, Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Senior Fellow; Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow on Ukraine issues at the European Council on Foreign Relations; Susan Corke, Director for Eurasia programs at Freedom House, Oleksander Sushko, Research Director at the Institute For Euro-Atlantic Co-operation.*

This initiative resulted in fruitful cooperation of the channels and the monitoring centers. In the course of the pre-election campaign the level of information broadcasting at some national channels substantially improved (especially at Inter channel). So, everyone has benefited from the initiative. The channels started to broadcast more quality information reports to be enjoyed by Ukrainian audience; and the monitoring agencies at last took their efforts not only to inform about various violations of the journalism standards during the elections, but to improve this activity.

## **When “anti” dominates over advertising**

***The unprecedented share of anti-advertising has become the trend of the parliamentary elections. AUP political advertising monitoring in August – October 2012.***

«Advertising is a reality even if it is produced with a considerable share of fantasy” – Jacques Segela, the French expert in election technologies and political communications said. In most cases the Ukrainian political parties’ advertising was far from reality, in other words, from the interests of an average voter. Therefore, a big share of Ukrainian voters got irritated with both the stories of one group on “the horrors of their predecessors” as well as on “improvements in life”, the latter actually not occurring; and the promises declared by their rivals on “we shall stop them”, which was not supported by real deeds. The advertising messages of other political forces, such “Our Ukraine”, “Ukraine-Forward!” or Lyashko Radical Party aroused only some irony, which found its reflection in a lot of Photoshop-changed comic images on this topic disseminated via social networks.

Evidently, television in Ukraine remains the key channel to disseminate political advertising. So, one can judge about the democratic level of elections by assessing the equality of opportunities for the elections’ race participants to realize this right.

During three months (August, September, October) the Academy of Ukrainian Press was implementing the **“Political advertising at the television during the pre-election campaign”** project. The political advertisements of the parties competing to win the seats in the Parliament were studied using the content analysis methodology. 8 top Ukrainian channels were included into the sample: *UT-1*, *1+1*, *Inter*, *STB*, *ICTV*, *Novy Channel*, *TVi* and *Ukraine*. Prime-time (19:00-23:00) was under analysis during the whole third week of each month.

Press releases and the monitoring presentations may be found at the [AUP web site](#) for each month.

### ***General trends***

**The first trend:** advertisement video clips was the most widely used type of political advertising during all three months while the monitoring survey was in progress, which means explicit advertising; attention was hardly paid to the parties’ election programs.




Thus, in October the **special advertisement videos** constituted 80% of all advertisements and 51% of all the time; in September – 84% and 49%, respectively; in August – 69% and 44%, respectively. During all three months they made up the whole advertising flow at *Novy Channel* and *STB*; the smallest share belongs to *TVi* – 55% (in September – 67%, in August – 37%).

The **share of explicit advertising** in the format of a special advertising product (short videos, films, announcements) made up 77% of air time in October (September – 71%, August – 76%); as regards number of advertisements it was 88% (September – 90%, in August – 84%).

The **hidden/anonymous advertising** was also present, however it was very rare. In October it was 2% of air time (in September – 2%, in August – 0%), the number of advertisements – 2% in October (in September – 1%, in August – 1%). Pinchuk media holding (*Novy Channel*, *STB*, *ICTV*) had the smallest share of hidden advertising.

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING

N=50592 sec




## POLITICAL PARTIES ADVERTISING TYPES October 2012, prime-time

October 2012  
N=2422 ads, N=112315 sec

**Trend two:** two thirds of political advertising was broadcast by *UT-1* and *TVi* channels that cannot boast high ranks in the ratings.

The total share of the prime-time allocated for advertising by the channels in October – 16% (in September – 14%, in August – 7%) (see the diagram below).

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




In October the number of advertisements was similar to September – 2422 vs. 2474 (in August – 1024), as for the time the advertisement flow increased by 1.1 times (112315 sec vs. 99247 sec). In August this figure was two times lower – 1024 advertisements, which were broadcast during 50592 sec.

**Serhiy Makeev**, Institute of Sociology, NASU, Social Structures Unit, Head, made a special note on such a remarkable peculiarity: "Around two thirds of all advertisements were broadcast not at the channels with the highest ranks in the ratings, but by UT-1 and TVi. In September these two channels accounted for 67% of all advertisements, in October the share was 56%". The sociologist does not provide the explanations why it happened so, but he notes that these messages obviously "have not reached the mass audience of voters".

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING

### Advertising flow October 2012, prime-time



**Trend three:** the channels had clear political preferences, which were reflected both in the news and in the presentation of political advertisements.

Ukraine channel and *Novy Channel* did not broadcast any CPU advertisements whatsoever.

1+1 did not broadcast any Batkivshchyna advertisements.


The share of Batkivshchyna and Our Ukraine advertisements was quite limited at *Novy Channel*.

*TRC Ukraine* featured the highest share of “Ukraine-Forward!” party’s advertisements: in October its share was 27.4% (number of advertisements) and 23.6% (share of air time) (in September – 32.7% and 23.2%, in August – 29.3% and 28.3%, respectively). It makes almost the same share as the Party of Regions has at this channel; in October it was 28.1%, (and 24.9% of air time) (in September – 27.2% and 37.2%, in August – 32.8% and 33.5% respectively).

*TVi* had the biggest share of Batkivshchyna advertisements: in October its share was 16.9% (number of advertisements), 23.7% (air time) (in September – 28.5% and 30.6%, in August – 15.7% and 26.2% respectively); whereas the party of regions had only 4.5% (number of advertisements) and 3.3% (air time) in October (in September – much bigger share – 27.5% and 21%, respectively, in August – 15.4% and 11.7%).




## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



**PARTIES  
ADVERTISING AT THE  
CHANNELS  
October  
2012, prime-  
time**


## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



**PARTIES'  
DVERTISING  
AT THE  
CHANNELS  
September  
2012, prime-  
time**

## The parties' political advertising at TV channels


August 2012, prime-time



**Trend three:** As for the number of advertisements and the air time Batkivshchyna and Party of Regions' blocks exceeded all other parties' advertising campaigns by many times:

In October the **leader in terms of the number of advertisements** was the Party of Regions – 23% (in September – 20%, in August – 31%) followed by Batkivshchyna – 17% (in September – 30%, in August – 16%), Our Ukraine – 13% (in September 11%, in August – 6%), Ukraine-Forward! – 9% (in September – 12%, in August – 9%), CPU – 7% (in September – 4%, in August – 10%), Svoboda – 7% (in September – 6%), UDAR – 4% (in September – 6%, in August – 7%).


## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### POLITICAL PARTIES ADVERTISING October 2012, prime-time




## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### POLITICAL PARTIES ADVERTISING September 2012, prime-time



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



**Political parties  
advertising  
August 2012,  
prime-time**




**As for the time** the ranking is the following: Batkivshchyna – 17% (in September – 22%, in August – 21%), Party of Regions – 16% (in September and August – 23% each), Ukraine-Forward! – 10% (in September – 6%, in August – 5%), Our Ukraine – 9% (in September – 8%, in August – 5%), Svoboda – 7% (in September – 5%), CPU – 5% (in September – 5%, in August – 7%), UDAR – 4% (in September – 6%, in August – 8%).

Also some independent candidates' advertisements appeared in October (6%), Oleh Lyashko Radical Party (5%) and the Green Party of Ukraine – 2%.

**Trend four:** only a fracture of advertising flow was personalized


In 57% of advertisements in October some political persons were present (in September – in 29%, in August – in 54%). The most frequently mentioned persons were as follows: Yuliya Tymoshenko – 13%, Viktor Yushchenko – 10%, Arseniy Yatsenyuk – 9% (in September – Nataliya Korolevska – 12%, Andriy Shevchenko – 7%, Vitaliy Klychko – 5%).

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



\*mentioned in more than 0.4% of all advertisements


## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



\*Mentioned in more than 0.3% of all advertisements



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



**Trend five:** binary character of values transferred through political advertising: social romanticism and humanitarian imperatives (the opposition's advertising) vs. social pragmatism and economic imperatives (the ruling party advertising).

**Trend six:** during this pre-election campaign the volume of political ant-advertising was the highest compared to all previous elections.

Two latter trends deserve a more detailed consideration.

### Political and social values

**First,** social values predominate in advertising over political values. Thus, in October social values were present in 84 of all advertisements (in September – in 98%, in August – in 83%). Political values were mentioned in 62% of advertisements in October (in September – in 69%, in August – in 66%). If we compare these data with the early parliamentary elections in 2007, in September 2007 political values were mentioned in 59% of advertisements.

**Secondly,** there is a controversy of positions of the ruling party and the opposition while representing values in political advertising. *"This means social pragmatism in the advertising by the ruling party and allied parties and social romanticism in*

## Access to media: election 2012

*the advertising of the opposition*", noted **Nataliya Kostenko**, Institute of Sociology, NASU, Culture Sociology and Mass Communication Unit, Head.

**Thirdly**, the core political value most frequently translated in advertising messages is Ukraine, its sovereignty, statehood; the core social value is the enhancement of the living conditions and social protection.


*"In fact, this phenomenon may be interpreted in the following manner: it [statehood, sovereignty] is in danger and it must be protected at any cost"* – **Serhiy Makeev** explains this dominance of the political value.

As for enhancement of living conditions and social protection, Serhiy Makeev thinks that *"in fact advertisements' message is that we are poor and very weak, both individually and within any association; thus, the political groups undertake a role of a protector, a guardian and a father"*

The combination of the values dominating in advertising flow varied a bit from month to month.

**October** featured the following dominating values:

- Political ones: Ukraine (statehood, sovereignty, country in general) – 36.2%; the management's professionalism – 10.1%; economic growth – 8.8%;




**VALUES IN  
POLITICAL  
ADVERTISING  
October 2012,  
prime-time**

**62 % of all  
advertisements  
include  
references to  
political values**




- Social values: improvement of living conditions, social protection – 40.4%; tradition and values – 31.8% (actively promoted in Our Ukraine videos); solidarity/national pride – 29%.

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



### VALUES IN POLITICAL ADVERTISING October 2012, prime-time


**84 % of all ads  
include references  
to social values**



### September's trends:

- Political values: change of the power – 32%; Ukraine (statehood, sovereignty, country in general) – 16.6%; economic growth – 12.6%;

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



### VALUES IN POLITICAL ADVERTISING September 2012, prime-time

**69 % of all  
advertisements  
include  
references to  
political values**






## Access to media: election 2012


- Social values: improvement of living conditions, social protection – 37.3%; mass support – 24.6%; freedom, democracy, human rights – 15.8%.

### POLITICAL ADVERTISING



### VALUES IN POLITICAL ADVERTISING September 2012, prime-time

**98 % of all advertisements include references to social values**




6

## August dominating trends:

- Political values: changes, dynamics – 29.2%; economic growth – 23.1%; Ukraine (statehood, sovereignty, country in general) – 21.3%;

### POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### VALUES IN POLITICAL ADVERTISING August 2012, prime-time

**66 % of all advertisements include references to political values**



5

- Social values: improvement of living conditions, social protection – 50%; stability, order, safety – 41.3%; justice – 22.5%.



However, the values cultivated in political advertising during the pre-election period have “limited shelf life”. According to Natalya Kostenko, “They may remain the part of rhetoric. But after the elections, as a rule, their regulative function is lost. The authorities often present a lot of reasons to justify this loss”.

**Fourthly**, political advertising strategies by “Our Ukraine” and “Ukraine-Forward!” parties did not work. “In October these two parties were the most active ones in advertising. However, neither appeal to roots tracked in Our Ukraine’s advertisements nor appeal to future observed in Ukraine-Forward! party, worked”, says Serhiy Makeev.


In other words, neither the content of their advertisements nor their huge number broadcast (especially in the case of “Ukraine-Forward!” party) did not help them to win seats in the Parliament.

Serhiy Makeev provides the following explanation: “Our many years’ experience of monitoring over advertising campaigns informs us that advertising campaign is not the method to recruit new supporters; it is the tool to mobilize the core and the way to inform as many people as possible about the fact that we exist, so that they will know us. But this awareness is not the reason for choice when one has to cast a ballot”.

## Anti-advertising

Anti-advertising was represented in absolute majority of all advertising media units; the channels allocated the unprecedented amount of time for anti-advertising. The number of anti-advertising reports exceeded that of simple advertisements.

55% of all advertisements broadcast by 8 channels included anti-advertising (in September – 75%, in August – 54%), as for the time the share was – 67% (in September – 80%, in August – 66%).



8

The experts pay attention to the trend that became visible after 2004 – the share of anti-advertising was growing from elections to elections. During the elections 2006 only one of ten advertisements included anti-advertising (10-11%). During the 2007 elections campaign this share considerably grew, making up 40%. At 2012 elections the figure reached 60%.


Natalya Kostenko states that Ukrainian situation is not unique. According to N. Kostenko, during the recent Presidential race in US every 3 of 4 advertising messages of both candidates contained anti-advertising elements.

However, the sociologist is sure that presence of such amount of anti-advertising creates certain threats. *“Anti-advertising, similar to other trash genres, actively probes into the borderline of what is appropriate. It is known that the borderline between usual humour, irony, reasonable criticism, sarcasm and, finally, stigma, may*

be very vague. Use of anti-advertising in such volumes requires high quality of political culture. Our advertising style does not possess such features", Natalya Kostenko pointed out.

The share of advertisements containing anti-advertising in October ranged from 41% at UT-1 to 75% at 1+1 (in September – from 59% at UT-1 to 92% at Novy Channel; in August – from 34% at TRC Ukraine to 64% at TVi). In terms of air time it ranged from 51% at Novy Channel to 81% at 1+1 (in September – from 70% at 1+1 to 88% at STB; in August – from 44% at TRC Ukraine to 76% at TVi).

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




N=2422  
advertisements,  
October 2012


### ANTI-ADVERTISING\* October 2012, prime-time

\*% of advertisements with  
anti-advertising

N=112315 sec,  
October 2012



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




N=2474  
advertisements,  
September 2012


### ANTI-ADVERTISING\* September 2012, prime-time

\*% of advertisements with  
anti-advertising

N=99247 sec,  
September 2012



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



Anti-advertising (in terms of time allocated) mostly concerns:

- The ruling power and the parliamentary coalition – - 30% in October (in September – 42%, in August – 31%),
- Party of Regions – 31% (in September – 22%, in August – 15%),
- UDAR – 20.7% (in September – only 1.8%),
- Batkivshchyna – 20.3% (in September – 12.7%).

The political personalities, which most often became the targets of anti-advertising, included: Vitaly Klychko – 19.4%, in September – Mykola Azarov (6.6%) and Andriy Shevchenko (10.3%).

**Yevhen Holovakha** thinks that anti-advertising has a deteriorating effect over public mood, “generates mass pessimism and mass disappointment”. Therefore, to his opinion, there is need in “positive advertising, which will be able to give voters at least some hopes”.

Most probably, politicians and their political consultants will use “hope-related” issues at the next Presidential elections.

The support of this set of surveys was provided through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and U-Media Program, Internews-Network. The project managers are Nataliya Kostenko, Doctor of Sociology, Valery Ivanov, Doctor of Philology.

## **Glossary**

***PARTY (BLOCK) ADVERTISEMENT /ADVERTISING REPORT*** – any positive or neutral mention about the party/block;

- During the pre-election campaign any positive or neutral mentioning about a political party/block/person carries out advertising function.

***ADVERTISEMENTS TYPES:***

- Explicit advertising – special advertising product/political program with positioning a party/person as an actor in the pre-election campaign (videos, reports on sponsorship, presence in TV programs);
- Hidden advertising – mentioning about the party/person “on the occasion”, mentioning about the party/person without actually naming them).

***ANTI-ADVERTISING*** – any ironical or negative mentioning about the party/block/person.

***ADVERTISING FLOW*** – the aggregate of all advertising items, broadcast by the channel/channels during the defined period of time.



## **Evaluating the access to pre-election campaign: international aspect**

*Ukrainian media landscape on the eve of the elections.* The freedom of journalists' work is an inalienable constituent part of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information in compliance with Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is a fundamental right, which essential for a democratic society. On the eve of elections international organization thoroughly monitor the conditions of media's work, because it is the time mass media have to comply with more strict requirements in terms of their professional standards: they are to inform voter about candidates and the pre-election campaign in an impartial manner.

During the pre-election campaign two events may be identified as key ones, which concentrated attention of both international and Ukrainian public. They are as follows: the bill on criminal liability for libel and the pressure on *TVi* channel.

Within the recent decade the positive changes were observed in both political and law environment of Ukraine: from the perspective of decriminalization of libel issue there were grounds to consider this problem totally resolved. However, the attempt was undertaken to reinstall this dangerous provision: MP Zhuravsky submitted a draft bill #11013, stipulating the return of criminal liability for libel and insult to dignity. Thus, the ruling authorities tried to pursue with a set of oppressive policy initiatives, following the example of Russia, which re-installed criminal liability for insulting the honor and dignity of a person in summer 2012.

Ukrainian and international organizations were unanimous in the opinion that such practice will follow the trend of limiting the rights and freedoms of citizens, particularly, violations of freedom of expression. The mentioned draft bill endangers the very essence of journalism as a profession, which can be realized only under conditions of freedom and critical views. The resistance of Ukrainian civil society resulted in revoking the bill by the author.

Similar concerns were raised by the situation around *TVi* channel. From the start of the pre-election campaign it was pressured by the tax administration and was switched off from the key cable networks in many regions. It was also refused in getting a license for digital broadcasting, which limits the chances of the channel to broadcast in future. This very precedent when the ruling authorities tried to substantially reduce the audience of the channel not controlled by the government, including by non-providing the license for digital broadcasting, let the international organizations make a conclusion on substantial reduction of pluralism

in media environment. In their turn, Ukrainian journalists and non-government organizations reacted by rallying in support for the channel.

Thus, the situation with the Law on libel and interference with professional activities of *TVi* has provided many international journalist organizations make a statement that the situation with the freedom of information worsened in Ukraine to such an extent that currently it is in the critical point of possible no return: "Although Ukraine refrained from introducing criminal liability for libel at the last moment, freedom of information is in big danger. The impossibility to punish the individuals who committed frequent acts of violence against journalists creates the atmosphere of intimidation that promotes censorship" – "Reporters without borders" stated.

### ***Evaluating the access to media during the pre-election period***

During the pre-election period a significant number of long-term and short-term missions worked in Ukraine. Each of them was preparing several types of position papers: preliminary reports, declarations on the eve of the elections and final reports, which are completed, as a rule, in 1-1.5 months after the date of elections.

The summing up Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions made by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) was the result of a common endeavour of the set of key European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, particularly the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).

The Statement included analysis of legal framework, the registration conditions for the candidates and voters, general conditions for the elections. Mass media chapter was one of the crucial ones as for the conditions to conduct elections.

The key conclusions are as follows:

"The media environment is characterized by a virtual absence of editorial autonomy on television. The politicization of TV by businesspeople and the dependence of state-owned broadcasters on the state budget significantly limit political pluralism, in favour of the ruling powers.

Provisions in the electoral law for voters' rights to "access to diverse, objective and unbiased information" and for unbiased and balanced coverage of contestants in the elections are a positive step but remain declarative. The law does not provide any definition of balanced coverage, and it does not define procedures and the body to monitor the compliance with rules"<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.osce.org/uk/odihr/elections/96677>



### *Access to media: election 2012*

One must note that since the moment of Ukraine had gained its independence it has been Ukrainian civil society organizations' role: to monitor the compliance with the rules and standards. The Equality of Opportunities Committee has started its activities on monitoring since 1994. The AUP has been involved in practically permanent content analysis monitoring project since 2002, studying media messages and intensifying its work on the eve of elections.

OSCE/ODIHR monitoring findings also confirm that the state-run *Pershy Natsionalny* also demonstrated its explicit loyal position to the Party of Regions.

Canada Mission was one of the most numerous. It stated:

"In the weeks leading up to the election, worrisome trends emerged in the media landscape in Ukraine. Public access to reliable and pluralistic sources of information had been on the decline and had worsened throughout the electoral cycle, further hindering the ability of voters to make well-informed choices.

The monopolization of media, especially in broadcasting, by relatively few has also meant a drop in quality of information consumed by citizens. The number of independent media organization has decreased over the last several years, and there has been a noticeable synchronization of news agendas. Given that most citizens rely on media for news and information, particularly television, a practical consequence has been difficulty for the opposition in obtaining media coverage – particularly in regions where media moguls are loyal to the governing party"<sup>2</sup>.

Similar situation has been recorded in the report by the National Democratic Institute (USA) issued on October 11, 2012: "In Ukraine pressure over journalists and mass media is still in progress. The range of information and the number of independent opinions still remains limited due to the considerable concentration of media ownership over the television channels, which are one of the key sources of information on elections".

ENEMO mission (European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations) considered the pressure over mass media, harsh fighting in the single constituency districts and non-transparent process of the district election committees to be the key problems of Ukrainian elections.

World Congress of Ukrainian observers also pointed out that most media coverage was allocated for the government and pro-government groups.

We should note that assessments were different and they can vary from mission to mission, but we provide here the findings of those institutions, which had long-term missions and had the opportunity to study Ukrainian media landscape in more details and more thoroughly.

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<sup>2</sup> [http://canademmissions.ca/ukraine/images/documents/Preliminary%20Report\\_UK.pdf](http://canademmissions.ca/ukraine/images/documents/Preliminary%20Report_UK.pdf)

## TV news survey (report summary)

### MONITORING OF POLITICAL NEWS

### August 2012 – October 2012

**GOAL of the survey:** to identify the status and dynamics of political content of the news broadcast by Ukrainian TV channels during the pre-election campaign  
**■ 7 waves of TV news monitoring : August - October 2012**

#### SAMPLING:

■ channels	■ News programs	■ channels	■ News programs
<b>1+1</b>	<b>TSN/ 19:30</b>	<b>ICTV</b>	<b>Fakty/ 18:45</b>
<b>Inter</b>	<b>Podrobnosti/ 20:00</b>	<b>STB</b>	<b>Vikna/ 22:00</b>
<b>Novy Channel</b>	<b>Reporter/ 19:00</b>	<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>Sobytiya/ 21:00</b>
<b>TVi</b>	<b>Syohodni/ 20:30</b>	<b>UT-1</b>	<b>Pidsumky dnya: 21:00</b>
<b>The 5<sup>th</sup> channel</b>	<b>Chas novyn / 19:00</b>		

- one news program per day, prime-time
- one week per month, September – two weeks, October – four weeks
- **August 6-12, September 03-08, 10-15, October 01-06, 08-13, 15-20, 22 – 27, 2012**
- **52 news programs/22 - 27 October 2012 - 701 news reports /65500 sec (news on Ukraine – 597 news reports /58870 sec)**

## METHODOLOGY

### KEY INDICATORS:

- ☐ degree of balance in interpretation of events
- ☐ ranking of attention to political actors /evaluation of political actors
- ☐ access of politicians to news (direct speech allocated)
- ☐ types of news broadcasting

### METHOD: content analysis of audio and visual information

- ☐ Content analysis was conducted by 6 operators. Coefficient of the methodology reliability: 85-95% (for different categories of analysis)
- ☐ Digital video records were made by AUP

*□ This monitoring research became possible due to the support of the American people. Monitoring results shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Academy of Ukrainian Press and not necessarily reflect the opinion of USAID and Internews Network.*

□ The project has been conducted by the Academy of Ukrainian Press in cooperation with the researchers of the Institute of Sociology, NASU since 2002. The support for this set of surveys was provided through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and U-Media Program, Internews Network. The survey is also funded by the International Renaissance and British Embassy in Ukraine. The project managers are Nataliya Kostenko and Valery Ivanov

## KEY CONCLUSIONS

### NEWS PROGRAMS ON THE EVE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS


#### Top channels news : October 4<sup>th</sup> week

- on the eve of the elections the share of political news noticeably grows (up to 39%), there are more news reports on elections than during the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> weeks (35% vs. 20%, 24% and 26% respectively)
- Inter channel features the largest share of news reports including two viewpoints
- Attention to political parties has grown in October compared to September; it remains stable during the whole month, but it is considerably lower than in 2007
- In October the ministries of the interior and defense remain the most frequently mentioned institutions; the leaders of attention among political associations are Party of Regions and Batkivshchyna
- Attention (except attention to the President of Ukraine) to Party of Regions' representatives was 10% more than that to Batkivshchyna; during the previous week attention was equal
- Inter and TVi featured the most balanced attention and direct speech allocated to political parties
- During the fourth week the share of direct speech allocated to the ruling power is three times bigger than that of the opposition; during the third week it was two times bigger



## INFORMATION FLOW

### NEWS PROGRAMS

October 22-27, 2012,  
prime-time




October 15-20, 2012,  
prime-time




% of political  
news in Ukraine


## POLITICAL EVENTS



## POLITICAL EVENTS



## POLITICAL EVENTS




## DYNAMICS OF KEY INDICATORS


### BALANCE OF SEVERAL VIEWPOINTS

(% of the reports with one and several viewpoints in the news of each channel, in the information flow in general)

03-08 September 2012, prime-time  
10-15 September 2012, prime-time  
01-06 October 2012, prime-time  
08-13 October 2012, prime-time  
15-20 October 2012, prime-time  
22-27 October 2012, prime-time




## POLITICAL ACTORS




## POLITICAL ACTORS

## ATTENTION TO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS\*




## POLITICAL ACTORS



*October 22-27, 2012,  
prime-time*

## EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS\*


*October 15-20, 2012,  
prime-time*



\* Distribution of evaluations of the institutions in the reports on Ukraine

11

## POLITICAL ACTORS



\* % of the reports with the mentions on the blocks/parties

## POLITICAL ACTORS

### EVALUATIONS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND FACTIONS\*

October 22-27, 2012, prime-time



**News on  
Ukraine**  
October 2012(4),  
n=597






	Позитив / нейтрально	Іронія / негатив
Batkvishshchyna	6,87%	0,50%
Party of Regions	4,86%	1,51%
CEC	4,52%	
UDAR	3,69%	0,84%
CPU	2,51%	
Ukraine-Forward!	2,51%	
Opposition in general	1,84%	0,17%
Ruling coalition	0,84%	0,67%
Committee of voters of Ukraine	1,51%	
Svoboda	1,17%	0,34%
BYUT-Batkvishshchyna	0,84%	0,34%
Lyashko Radical party	0,84%	
OPORA	0,67%	
NDPU	0,50%	
Pinchuk Charitable Foundation	0,50%	
Other committees	0,34%	

\* % of reports with positive-neutral and negative-ironical mentions on the parties and political groups

## POLITICAL ACTORS


### ATTENTION TO POLITICIANS: "POWER BONUS"

**September 2004 - October 2012**






## POLITICAL ACTORS



## POLITICAL ACTORS

### POLITICAL PERSONS: EVALUATIONS\*

October 22-27, 2012, prime-time



### News on Ukraine


\* % of the reports with positive neutral and negative-ironic mentions about the politicians



	Позитив / нейтрально	Іронія / негатив
Yanukovich V	9,55%	2,18%
Azarov M	7,37%	0,17%
Tymoshenko Yu	4,52%	1,68%
Yatsenyuk A	3,69%	0,17%
Klychko V	3,02%	2,01%
Melnychenko M	1,84%	0,34%
Korolevska N	2,35%	0,17%
Polishchuk V	2,18%	0,17%
Symonenko P	2,01%	0,50%
Kuchma L	1,68%	0,50%
Tyhytko S	1,51%	0,17%
Boyko Yu	1,51%	0,17%
Chernenko O	1,51%	0,17%
Pshonka V	1,17%	0,17%
Popov O	1,34%	0,17%
Bezbakh Ya	1,17%	0,17%
Rozynska N	1,17%	0,17%
Kolesnykov B	1,01%	0,17%
Hrytsenko A	1,01%	0,17%
Lazarenko P	1,01%	0,84%
Tyahnibok O	0,84%	0,50%
Lutsenko Yu	0,84%	0,50%
Vlasenko S	0,84%	0,17%
Vilkul O	0,84%	0,17%



## POLITICAL MAP




## DYNAMICS OF KEY INDICATORS

### DISTRIBUTION OF ATTENTION TO THE ELECTIONS' PARTICIPANTS

(distribution of attention for political parties at every channel in the general information flow (%))

September 03-08 2012, prime-time  
September 10-15 2012, prime-time  
October 01-06 2012, prime-time  
October 08-13 2012, prime-time  
October 15-20 2012, prime-time  
October 22-27 2012, prime-time



\* Share (%) of the direct speech of the politician in the total amount of direct speech of all political parties' representatives


Distribution of attention to politicians

## DYNAMICS OF KEY INDICATORS

### DISTRIBUTION OF THE DIRECT SPEECH ALLOCATED FOR THE ELECTIONS' PARTICIPANTS

(distribution of the direct speech allocated for  
political parties representatives at each channel  
in the general information flow (%))

September 03-08, 2012, prime-time  
September 10-15, 2012, prime-time  
October 01-06, 2012, prime-time  
October 08-13, 2012, prime-time  
October 15-20 2012, prime-time  
October 22-27 2012, prime-time



\* Share (%) of the direct speech of in the general information flow

Direct speech distribution

## Political advertising survey (report summary)

### Political advertising at television August – October 2012

**PROJECT: Political advertising at television during the pre-election campaign" (August-October 2012)**

**MODEL:**

- ☐ **Content analysis of the political advertising by the parties competing to win the seats in the Parliament**  
(Kmethodology reliability coefficient: 85-95%)
- ☐ **8 top Ukrainian TV channels**
- ☐ **The third full week of each month**
- ☐ **19:00 - 23:00**
- ☐ The support of the survey was provided through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and U-Media Program, Internews-Network. The project managers are Nataliya Kostenko, Doctor of Sociology, Valery Ivanov, Doctor of Philology.

*This monitoring research became possible due to the support of the American people. Monitoring results shall be the exclusive responsibility of the Academy of Ukrainian Press and not necessarily reflect the opinion of USAID and Internews Network.*

## METHODOLOGY

### KEY INDICATORS

- **volume of advertising of a political party (in the flow, at each channel)**
  - **share of the political advertising of a political party in the advertising flow (number of advertisements/sec)**
- **explicit & and hidden advertising of a political party**
- **Values in advertising**
- **share of anti-advertising**

### KEY TERMS:

■ **PARTY (BLOCK) ADVERTISEMENT /ADVERTISING REPORT** - any positive or neutral mention about the party/block;

■ - During the pre-election campaign any positive or neutral mentioning about a political party/block/person carries out advertising function.

■ **ADVERTISEMENTS TYPES-**

- - Explicit advertising – special advertising product/political program with positioning a party/person as an actor in the pre-election campaign (videos, reports on sponsorship, presence in TV programs);
- - Hidden advertising – mentioning about the party/person "on the occasion", mentioning about the party/person without actually naming them).

■ **ANTI-ADVERTISING** - any ironical or negative mentioning about the party/block/person.

■ **ADVERTISING FLOW** - the aggregate of all advertising items, broadcast by the channel/channels during the defined period of time.

## KEY FINDINGS

### *POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN ELECTIONS-2012, October*

#### The channels advertising strategies :

- the special advertisement videos constituted 80% of all advertisements and 50% of all the time; they account for all advertisement types at Novy channel and STB; TVi features the biggest variety of advertisement types

#### The parties advertising strategies:

- Minimum of attention to the parties election programs; the most active parties in advertising are as follows: Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Our Ukraine and "Ukraine-Forward!"
- On the eve of the elections advertisements by Lyashko Radical Party, Green Party of Ukraine, independent candidates in single constituency districts, Nova Polityka party, Green Planet start to appear
- The parties having real chances to win the seats in the Parliament prefer explicit advertising
- The share of anti-advertising is similar to August and less than in September
- Hierarchy of political and social values changes in the course of the pre-election campaign

#### Motif:

- Solidarity based on anti-advertising


#### Values:

- Predominant political value – Ukraine (statehood, sovereignty), social value – improvement of living conditions and social protection

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



### *Advertising flow October 2012, prime-time*

NUMBER OF ADS




Early parliamentary elections  
2007

TIME (SEC)



Parliamentary elections 2012




August 2012   September 2012   October 2012   August-September 2007 – 10 channels  
August-September 2012 – 8 channels

August 2012   September 2012   October 2012

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING


### ADVERTISING FLOW October 2012, prime-time




August 20-25 2012

September 17-22 2012

October 15-20 2012





## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING


### MENTIONS ABOUT A PARTY October 2012, prime-time

October 15-20 2012





*Political  
advertising (special video  
labeled as "political  
advertisement")*

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### ADVERTISING BY POLITICAL PARTIES August 2012, prime-time







## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### Political parties advertising вересень 2012, prime-time



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### POLITICAL PARTIES ADVERTISING October 2012, prime-time




## Political advertising

### PARTIES ADVERTISING AT THE CHANNELS August - October 2012, prime-time




## POLITICAL ADVERTISING


### PARTIES ADVERTISING AT THE CHANNELS August - October 2012, prime-time




## POLITICAL ADVERTISING






## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




### POLITICAL PARTIES ADVERTISEMENT TYPES October 2012, prime-time

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



### POLITICAL PARTIES ADVERTISEMENT TYPES October 2012, prime-time

N=2422 ads




## POLITICAL ADVERTISING


Parliamentary  
elections 2012

ANTI-ADVERTISING\*  
October 2012, prime-time


\*% of ads with anti-  
advertising




N=1024 ads, August  
2012




N=2474 ads,  
September 2012




N=2422 ads October  
2012



N=50592 sec,  
August 2012




N=99247 sec,  
September 2012



N=112315 sec,  
October 2012

## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




**N=2422 ads,  
October 2012**


**ANTI-ADVERTISING\***  
*October 2012, prime-time*

\*% of ads with anti-advertising

N=112315 sec,  
October 2012





## POLITICAL ADVERTISING




**ANTI-  
ADVERTISING\***  
*October 2012,*


\*% number of ads with anti-advertising



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING



## POLITICAL ADVERTISING





# POLITICAL ADVERTISING

**VALUES IN POLITICAL  
ADVERTISING October  
2012, prime-time**



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**Translated by Serhiy Dyoma**

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