How journalism survives Ukraine’s war: an interview with Andriy Kovalenko

10.03.2026  

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed war reporting, just as it has changed the front line itself. The front is no longer a fixed boundary but a shifting network of artillery zones, drone surveillance and missile strikes that carry danger far beyond traditional combat areas. Journalists arriving in Ukraine must navigate the violence of the conflict and the technological realities of a battlefield saturated with drones, electronic warfare and constant observation.

Few understand these conditions better than Andriy Kovalenko, a Ukrainian local producer and Executive Director of the Academy of Ukrainian Press. Since the first days of the 2022 invasion, Kovalenko has worked closely with international correspondents, helping them report safely from some of the war’s most dangerous areas, including Kyiv, Bucha, Irpin and the surrounding regions. His work combines logistical coordination, interpretation and field production, often under conditions in which safety decisions must be made quickly and with incomplete information.

Author: Scott Douglas Jacobsen.

Originally published as How Journalism Survives Ukraine’s War. The Ukrainian version published by AUP was translated using Perplexity.ai. Illustration by John Lyman.

Kovalenko’s experience has given him a distinctive perspective on how modern warfare is changing journalism. From advising reporters on cultural awareness and operational security to explaining how drones have extended the “kill zone” far beyond the front, he has become an informal instructor for many foreign journalists trying to understand, and survive, the realities of reporting in Ukraine. In this interview, he reflects on how war reporting has changed in the drone age and why preparation, discipline and humility are essential in a conflict where, as he puts it, no story is worth a life.

Preparing international journalists for a different kind of war

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: You have worked closely with many international reporters, including people like me, who arrive with very different levels of institutional support, financial resources and previous experience in conflict zones. When you train journalists from places as varied as Western Europe, the Middle East, North America and Latin America, how do you adapt your guidance to their backgrounds? In particular, how do you convey cultural context, security awareness and practical field knowledge to journalists from different professional and regional cultures so that they can understand and apply it effectively in Ukraine?

Andriy Kovalenko: That is an interesting question. My focus is to give them clear information about the country: Ukraine, our culture and the realities they need to understand to work here. That comes first.

I also provide cultural context. Ukraine is a multicultural country, so coverage often depends on the people at the centre of the story. The second priority is explaining the security situation through information and practical examples. Even journalists with military experience who have covered conflicts in Chechnya, Georgia or Iraq must adapt to this war.

For example, I have worked with Süddeutsche Zeitung, a major German newspaper, and its journalist Florian Hassel. Hassel has covered Chechnya and other conflict zones.

This war differs from many previous conflicts in how much can be seen and shared in real time through modern technology. Another difference is that Ukrainian military structures have often been relatively open to working with international and domestic media, with an interest in showing what is happening on the ground.

Security is another major concern, especially because of technological developments such as drones. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukrainian forces started using commercial drones, such as the DJI Mavic range, adapting them for reconnaissance and, in some cases, improvised strikes.

Then came the era of FPV drones, which changed the battlefield considerably. FPV systems used in Ukraine often cost around US$500, sometimes more.

This creates a substantial cost imbalance: a relatively cheap drone can destroy or disable armoured vehicles worth millions. The price of modern main battle tanks varies by model, but many cost several million dollars, and some variants exceed US$10 million.

This shift has helped define the age of drones and artillery. Tanks have not become useless, but they are far more vulnerable and now require different tactics, protection systems and operational support from those used in earlier conflicts.

Tanks can still operate, mainly in support of infantry during offensive operations, as we saw even in 2023. By the time of Ukraine’s counteroffensive that year, Russia had already developed its drone capabilities considerably. As a result, several Western tanks, including Leopards and some Challengers, were damaged or destroyed by Russian artillery, anti-tank weapons and drones.

So it works both ways. It has become a technological competition over who can develop something new, or improve and adapt drone systems, more quickly. Fibre-optic-controlled drones are one example.

Last year, these drones generally operated at distances of around one to five kilometres. Recently, after returning from Donetsk region, I saw systems capable of operating over roughly forty to fifty kilometres using fibre-optic control.

This also raises serious security concerns. Russian forces often do not distinguish clearly between targets. If they see a vehicle they consider a possible target, they may attack it. Even vehicles marked for evacuation, ambulances and press vehicles can be targeted.

As a result, we increasingly stop marking vehicles “PRESS” and, in some cases, remove press markings from body armour. I also advise journalists against military colours such as camouflage or green. Clothing and protective equipment should be neutral: black, blue or other civilian colours.

Another issue is what we call the “kill zone”. Traditionally, the battlefield was understood as the zero line, the immediate front. Today, the kill zone can extend twenty to thirty kilometres from the front. Cities such as Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and Kherson can fall within this area of risk.

This danger affects both sides of the conflict. The area has therefore become much more dangerous than before. Even a year ago, Kramatorsk, although a frontline city, was relatively safer. That is no longer the case. Drones operate there very frequently.

As a precaution, we sometimes use drone analysers or detectors. These devices do not provide direct protection, but they help us understand what is happening. The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine provided me with one because it knows I often work with foreign journalists.

The device can intercept a drone’s video signal, showing the same view the operator sees. It allows you to see the landscape, the drone’s direction and its approximate distance. That information can be critical.

If you realise a drone is approaching your position or vehicle, you have a little more time to react. You may be able to drive away quickly. If there is not enough time, you may conceal the vehicle using terrain or structures. In some situations, the only option is to leave the vehicle and run for cover.

Because of these developments, working near the front today is very different from the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

Medical training, logistics and assessing risk

Jacobsen: Beyond cultural awareness and briefings on the situation, what practical advice do you give journalists preparing to work near the front, or simply to report elsewhere in Ukraine during the war? From tactical medicine and logistics to accommodation, navigation and movement through contested areas, what are the most important precautions or habits foreign reporters should develop before working in such an unpredictable security environment?

Kovalenko: Tactical medical training is essential. It is the foundation of safety in the field for several reasons. First, you must be able to save yourself. Second, you may save members of your team. Third, you may help wounded civilians or soldiers.

This goes beyond the standard MARCH protocol in combat medicine. The situation in Ukraine is often different because evacuation times are unpredictable. Many military doctrines refer to the “golden hour” for evacuation and treatment. In Ukraine, that timeframe is often impossible. Evacuation may take many hours, especially because drone activity can prevent vehicles from reaching the wounded. Sometimes people have to stay where they are for six to eight hours before evacuation becomes possible.

Tourniquet use therefore has to be managed carefully. A tourniquet is generally applied for a limited period, often one to two hours, because prolonged restriction of blood flow can cause serious tissue damage. In current conditions, medics often combine tourniquets with wound packing and other techniques to stabilise bleeding while reducing the risk of long-term harm. That is why practical tactical medical training is so important.

Logistics is another major concern. Journalists near the front should avoid hotels in frontline regions. Renting a flat or other private accommodation is safer instead. Russian strikes have repeatedly targeted hotels known to accommodate journalists. In Kharkiv region alone, several hotels have been destroyed during the war, and several journalists have been injured in such attacks.

I experienced this myself in Kharkiv in October 2023, when a Russian missile struck a hotel. I was in bed when the blast shattered the windows. A falling frame injured me, breaking two ribs. I also suffered cuts and bruises, and our car outside was destroyed. Experiences like that make it clear that hotels are often targets.

Navigation is another issue. During major air alerts in regions such as Donetsk and Kharkiv, or sometimes even Kyiv, electronic interference can disrupt GPS signals. Navigation systems may then stop working properly. It is important to download offline maps and familiarise yourself with the local road network in advance.

In frontline regions, it is easy to take a wrong turn and find yourself somewhere extremely dangerous. If you are driving through Donetsk region, for example, a wrong turn could take you towards Pokrovsk or other active frontline areas.

When driving near the front, we advise opening a window slightly and listening for drones. Many drones are fast but also noisy, so you can sometimes hear them approaching. At the same time, someone in the car should constantly watch the road and surroundings. Many teams effectively have a second observer watching the sky and terrain.

Many frontline roads are now covered with anti-drone nets, structures sometimes called “anti-drone tunnels”. They offer some protection, but it is not perfect. In some cases, one drone can damage the net, creating an opening through which another attacks vehicles. These structures mainly give drivers more time to react.

Another critical point is understanding the risks. This is not a computer game. There is no restart button and no second attempt. You have one life. No story from the front is worth dying for. A journalist who dies cannot tell the story.

You must therefore keep assessing whether entering a dangerous area is genuinely necessary. Sometimes a story can be reported from a safer location or by speaking to people who have been there.

Digital security and everyday reporting

Jacobsen: Modern warfare is also deeply shaped by digital infrastructure: communications networks, satellite connections and a constant flow of online information. For journalists in Ukraine, what role do tools such as VPNs and other digital security measures play in everyday reporting? Are there particular digital precautions, communication practices or technological habits that journalists should adopt to work safely and effectively in a conflict where cyber risks and information control are increasingly part of the battlefield?

Kovalenko: In terms of digital security, VPNs are useful in several situations. Russian websites and online services are often blocked in Ukraine, so journalists may need a VPN to access Russian sources for research. In some frontline regions, certain online platforms or communication tools may work more reliably through a VPN.

Money is another practical issue. Even in damaged towns in Donetsk region, such as Dobropillia, people run small shops. Many places use generators and Starlink, which sometimes makes card payments possible. It is still sensible to carry cash in hryvnias because electricity and connectivity may fail.

Finally, during major air attacks, it is important to follow basic shelter precautions. One common recommendation is the “two walls rule”: stay away from windows and keep at least two solid walls between you and the outside. Bathrooms or internal corridors are often safer. Lower floors are generally safer.

Of course, the best option is to go to a proper underground shelter. If that is impossible, these precautions may improve your chances of surviving a missile or drone strike.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Andriy.

This historical interview describes the speaker’s experience at the time of publication. It is not a substitute for current professional safety advice or medical training.

Translation note: This is a literary translation into British English, produced and proofread using a language model. Read the Ukrainian original.

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